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Comments
Jutta Brunnee* The Reunification of Germany:
Comments on a Legal Maze
The German People
Conscious of their responsibility before God and men,
Animated by the resolve to preserve their national and political unity and
to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe,
Desiring to give a new order to political life for a transitional period,
Have enacted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law for the
Federal Republic of Germany.
They have also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation
was denied.
The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free self-
determination the unity and freedom of Germany.'
1. Introduction
In its Preamble, the Basic Law - the constitution - of the Federal
Republic of Germany declares itself a transitional order put in place until
all Germans can freely decide to live in a reunified Germany. The
Preamble is evidence of both history and aspirations of the western part
of Germany that emerged from the Second World War. It is now one of
the legal foundations for an event that only a year ago few thought was
possible: the merging of the German Democratic Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany into one German state. In its preamble and
in several other provisions the Basic Law kept the door open for a home
coming without precedent. Some said this door had, over the years,
become a legal fiction. Yet the events of the past year, culminating in the
opening of the Berlin Wall on the night of November 9, 1989, came as
a surprise even to the most optimistic observers. The citizens of the
German Democratic Republic forced the door open with peaceful means
and the most compelling of all passwords: "We are the People".2
*Dr. Jutta Brunnre, Faculty of Law, McGill University. She was awarded her Doctorate at
Johannes Gutenberg-Universitat, Mainz, West Germany in 1989.
1. Preamble of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949,
(Bonn:Press and Information Office of the Federal Government 1981).
2. See P. Haberle, "Verfassungspolitik fur die Freiheit und Einheit Deutschlands" (1990), 45
Juristenzeitung 358 at 360 [Constitutional Policy for Freedom and Unity of Germany]; for
critical voices see J. 0. Jackson, "Broken Dreams on the Road to Merger", TIME (Special
Issue) June 25, 1990 at 20.
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This comment will attempt to shed some light on the multi-faceted
legal situation of Germany, a web of national and international law
problems. It will outline the situation created in the years following 1945
and the resulting development of the two German states. It will then
review the possibilities for their reunification available under the
constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Finally it will
high-light some of the legal issues facing the reunified Germany in the
future. As the dust stirred up by the crumbling wall settles, it becomes
clear that the opening of the gates was not the most difficult step. The true
challenge is finding the way through at the right pace and with the route
carefully staked.
II. The Creation of Two German States
1. Historical Development
Not too long ago talking about the two German states conjured up
images of on-going cold war, iron curtain and abnormalities that seemed
to aquire disheartening normality in German-German relations. Berlin
was an island of western lifestyle and culture in the middle of one of the
most rigid socialist states. Many were killed when attempting to cross the
border into the Federal Republic. The German-German border was one
of the most heavily guarded frontiers in Europe, featuring a "death strip"
with mine fields, self-firing devices, barbed wire fences, dogs, and heavily
armed border guards. From the western point of view, however, this
border was not even a border under the standards of international law.
While travellers on the way from East Berlin to West Berlin were free to
enter (provided, of course, eastern authorities let them go), those heading
in the opposite direction faced lengthy controls or even denial of entry.
While the German Democratic Republic claimed there were two entirely
separate states' on German ground, the Federal Republic issued its
passports to all Germans requesting it.
Such are only a few examples of the complicated German-German
relations which grew out of the division of one nation into two states
belonging to antagonistic alliances and existing at the friction laden edges
of these alliances' tectonic plates. Since the end of the war the relations
between the two German states have been among the most reliable
indicators of the overall east-west climate.3 They were born out of the
chilling down of this climate to cold war temperatures and would not
have melted into their present form without the events in Eastern Europe.
3. Deutscher Bundestag, Interrogeons l'Histoire de l'Allemagne (Bonn 1988) at 401
[hereinafter: Interrogeons].
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However, inner-German relations have always been complicated and
the question of what and where Germany was could never be settled for
more than limited periods of time.4 This goes far back in European
history which has witnessed the rise and fall of various German tribes and
their attempts to group and regroup. Unlike France or England, where a
sense of national unity and a strong royal house began to develop
relatively early on, Germany remained an array of competing territories
and sovereigns. In 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty
Years War, Germany was fragmented into hundreds of units.5 It was not
unified as a national state until 1871, when the German Empire was
established as a result of Bismarck's policy.6 The German Empire had
roughly the same size of Spain. Losing World War I, however, it ceded
a part of its territory in the southwest to France and in the east to the
newly created state of Poland (Treaty of Versailles). 7 The territorial limits
thus created remained unchanged until December 13, 1937. In 1938
Hitler started his policy of territorial expansion.
When the Acts of Surrender were signed after the war, Germany was
completely occupied by Allied forces. 8 Anglo-American forces initially
occupied almost half of what was to become the German Democratic
Republic. Later these territories were handed over to the Soviet Union in
exchange for the western sectors of Berlin.9 This is how the "island
situation" of the former capital was created.
Germany was, within the frontiers of December 31, 1937, and for the
purposes of occupation, divided into four zones and a special Berlin area
which was to be jointly occupied and divided by the Four Powers.10 At
4. See C.E Menger, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 5th ed., (1986) at 15
[Modern German Constitutional History]; for a brief and very readeable account of these
aspects of German history see Otto Friedrich, "Germany Toward Unity", TIME (Special Issue)
June 25, 1990, 12-23.
5. Friedrich, supra,note 4, at 17; Menger, supra, note 4, at 25 et.seq.
6. Menger, supra, note 4, at 141-146.
7. Interrogeons, supra, note 3 at 252; on the Treaty itself see: E. von Puttkamer, "Versailles
Peace Treaty", in: R. Bernhardt et.al., eds., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol.4
(1982), 276.
8. See Declaration of June 5, 1945 Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of
Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany, CMND 1552, Doc. No.7, at 38; for a good
overview on events and issues see: T.Schweisfurth, "Germany, Occupation after the War", in:
R. Bernhardt et.al., eds., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol.3 (1982), 191.
9. See R. Piotrowicz, "The Border Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic: A Demarcation Line or just an International Frontier?" (1989),
XXXVI Netherlands International Law Journal, 317.
10. Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin, UNTS 227, 279
et seq..
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the Potsdam Conference of August 1945, all German territories east of
the Oder-Neisse-Line were removed from the Soviet zone and placed
under Polish administration." The result was a shift to the west of Poland
and of the Soviet Union, which incorporated the Baltic states, north-
eastern Prussia and large portions of polish territory.
12
The occupying powers did not only take over supreme authority in
Germany, but also, in their respective zones, the entire administration of
the country. This was to provide the German people with time to prepare
for the reestablishment of its life on a democratic and peaceful basis. 3
However, economic reasons and increasing alienation of the western and
Soviet occupiers, eventually led to their decision to separately realize
their conceptions of what was to become of Germany. The three western
Allies, together with the Netherlands and Luxembourg, worked out the
foundation of a separate West German state (Frankfurt Documents).
14
They authorized the provincial governments in their respective zones to
convene a constituent assembly (Parliamentary Council). The assembly
was to draft a democratic constitution for a federal state and to provide
for the possibility of an eventual reestablishment of German unity.
On May 8, 1949 the accordingly established Parliamentary Council
adopted the provisional order for the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Basic Law. On May 12, 1949 the western powers approved the Basic
Law which entered into force on May 23, 1949.15 They simultaneously
promulgated the "Occupation Statute", pursuant to which the new
federal state and its participating Liinder were to have full legislative,
executive and judicial powers subject to certain rights of the occupying
powers. 16 By 1955 the occupation of the western zones of Germany was
terminated and the Federal Republic of Germany essentially became a
sovereign state.17 The Federal Republic had meanwhile become a
member of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) and NATO
(1955).18
11. Piotrowicz, supra, note 9, at 316; texts of all important documents can be found in: I. von
Munch, Dokumente des geteilten Deutschlands (1976) [Documents on the Divided Germany].
12. Menger, supra, note 4, at 193; for a chronology of events see Interrogeons, supra, note 3,
at 527 et seq.
13. Menger, supra, note 4 at 194.
14. Ibid 201 et seq.; Maunz-Zippelius, Deutsches Staatsrech4 26th ed., (1985) at 6 [German
Public Law].
15. Interrogeons, supra, note 3 at 385 et.seq..
16. See Menger, supra note 4 at 209.
17. Artikel 2, vertrag uber die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundes-republik Deutschland und
den Drei Machten vom 26.5.1952/23.10.54, BGBI. 1955 II, 301 et seq. [Treaty on the
Relations Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers].
18. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, UNTS 261, 140; North
Atlantic Treaty, UNTS 34, 243.
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In the Soviet zone the occupation regime was also terminated in stages.
The Soviet Union regarded all the above mentioned events in the western
zones as incompatible with the agreements on Germany. Being unable,
however, to prevent them, she countered them with similar measures.
She allowed the foundation of a second German state, the German
Democratic Republic, the first constitution of which was passed by the
so-called German People's Congress on May 30, 1949.19 After Soviet
suggestions regarding the unification of Germany under a socialist system
had failed, administrative functions for the GDR were transferred to a
provisional government under Soviet supervison. In 1954 the Soviet
Government declared it established the same relations with the GDR as
with other sovereign states.20 In 1955 the Warsaw Treaty was signed
under the participation of the GDR.21 In 1968 an new constitution
entered into force.22 However, the Basic Rights had become "socialist
personality rights", a self-declared "real democracy" was set up and the
unitary model of statehood was entrenched in the constitution. 23 Revised
in 1974, the constitution stated that the German Democratic Republic
was forever and irrevocably allied to the Soviet Union.24
2. LegalAspects
The result of these developments was a complicated state of affairs, which
prevailed until the recent historical events. The post-war Germany fell
into four different categories:
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany with roughly 95,000 square
miles and 60 million inhabitants.
(2) The German Democratic Republic comprising about 41,000
square miles and a little less than a third of the Federal Republic's
inhabitants.
(3) Berlin which was divided into a western part of 187 square miles
and approximately 2 million inhabitants and an eastern part of 157
square miles and around 1.1 million inhabitants.
19. Maunz-Zippelius, supra, note 14 at 449; Menger, supra, note 4, at 210.
20. Souveranitatserklarung der Sovietunion gegenUber der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik, reprinted in (1954) Europa Archiv 6534 et seq. [Declaration of Sovereignty
Regarding the German Democratic Republic].
21. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, UNTS 299, 3.
22. Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 5th ed. (Berlin: Staatsverlag der
DDR 1980).
23. Menger, supra, note 4, at 210.
24. Artikel 6; the Preamble speaks of the responsibility to direct the entire German nation to
a future in peace and socialism, having regard for the historical fact that imperialism under the
leadership of the United States in agreement with circles of West German monocapitalism split
Germany.
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(4) The controversial "Eastern Territories" (which had been part of
Germany within the frontiers of December 31, 1937) which, with
approximately 45,000 square miles had once constituted almost a
quarter of Germany.
This situation entailed several issues which remained controversial
between the two German states. Had the German Empire ceased to exist
with the capitulation of the German Army? Were the German
Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany two new
and distinct states and their relations of international character? Was the
border between the two German states an international border like any
other? Were the Germans living within the borders of December 31,
1937 of one nationality or had they assumed new national identities?
According to the Eastern view the German Empire had ceased to exist
with the unconditional surrender of the armed forces in 1945.25 The
Allied occupying powers established new administrative bodies and
exercised their own and not German executive powers. A German
administration was only gradually re-established until, eventually, the
two parts of Germany were authorized to build new states.26 Therefore,
the argument went, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal
Republic of Germany became successor states to the German Empire.
Similarly, there are no intra-state relations between the two countries. All
relations are based upon international law.
The West German position, which was generally shared by the
western Allies, maintained that the German Empire did not perish. As the
"Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany" signed by the
Commanders-in-Chief of the Four Powers on June 5, 1945 explicitly
stated, there was no annexation of Germany. 27 Consequently the
executive powers of Germany did not cease to exist; they were exercised
by the Allies in place of the German authorities. There was a military
surrender, but no dissolution of the German state. 28 According to the
western view, the German Empire, within its borders of 1937, still existed
although it was not capable of acting.29 The Federal Republic of
Germany is thus partially identical with the German Empire. However,
it is not entitled to act for all of Germany. This view was confirmed in the
25. See Menger, supra, note 4, at 214; interestingly this view was shared by some western
scholars: see Kelsen, "The Legal Status of Germany according to the Declaration of Berlin"
(1945), 39 American Journal of International Law 518.
26. Maunz-Zippelius, supra, note 14, at 9.
27. H. von Mangoldt, "Zur Rechtslage Berlins" (1990), 34 Recht in Ost und West at 3 [On
the Legal Situation of Berlin].
28. I. von Seidi-Hohenveldern, Vo1kerrecht, 4th ed. (1980) at 149 [Public International Law].
29. Maunz-Zippelius, supra, note 14 at 9.
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1973 landmark decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the
"Grundlagenvertrag" (Basic Treaty). 30 Flowing from this position was
the assertion that the inner-German border was not an international
border strictly speaking. 31 Similarly, while both German states were
sovereign (members of the UN), their relations were of special character.
And, finally, all persons of German citizenship living within the 1937
borders were one people.32 This was a result of the fact that the question
of who has German citizenship is still governed by a law of 1913 when
Germany covered the controversial areas. 33 As a result the Federal
Republic, having responsibilities regarding all of Germany, but able to
exercise power only within its territory, would issue passports to all
Germans.3
4
The Preamble of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
as well as several other of its provisions bear witness to these positions.
The call for the reunification of Germany thus entrenched in the Basic
Law is consistent with the views just presented. It is also a demand
flowing from the right to self-determination of peoples confirmed in the
Friendly Relations Declaration. 35 As such it was at different stages
recognized by the former occupying powers.36
Article 7 of the Agreement on the Relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Three Powers of May 26, 1952 states that
a final determination of the German borders presupposes a peace treaty
between Germany and its former adversaries. 37 The signatories agree that
30. BVerfGE 36,1; exerpts in English language in (1976), 70 American Journal of
International Law at 147; the Basic Treaty is a product of Willy Brandt's new "Ostpolitik"
which undertook to put the German-German relations on new foundations. Both countries are
called upon to develop good neighbourly relations on a basis of equality. Among other things
they were to accept the inviolability of their frontiers. The Bavarian government challenged the
constitutionalty of the Treaty on the grounds of incompatibility with the goal of reunification.
31. Menger, supra, note 4 at 213; Piotrowicz, supra, note 9 at 317.
32. Article 116 (1) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany reads:
Unless otherwise provided by law, a German within the meaning of this Basic Law is
a person who possesses German citizenship or who has been admitted to the territory
of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee
of German stock (Volkszugehorigkeit) or as the spouse or descendant of such a person.
33. Piotrowicz, supra, note 9 at 321; and R. Bernhardt, "German Nationality", in:
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol.8 (1985) 255 et.seq..
34. Regarding the impact of this policy on the events of the fall of 1989 see: C. Starck,
"Deutschland auf dem Wege zur staatlichen Einheit" (1990), 45 Juristenzeitung 349 at 350
(Germany on the Way to Unity as a State].
35. GAOR, 25th Session, Suppl. No. 28, 2625 (XXV), 121 et seq.; see also E. Klein, "The
Concept of the Basic Law", in: C. Starck, ed., Main Principles of the German Basic Law
(1983), 15 at 25,26 [hereinafter: in:t Starck].
36. Starck, supra, note 34 at 350.
37. See supra, note 17.
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until then they will peacefully pursue their common goal, that of the
reunification of Germany under a free and democratic order and
integrated into the European Community.38 Similar statements can be
found in other Allied documents on the status of Germany and have only
recently been confirmed by the three western Powers. 39 The idea of
reunification had also been confirmed by the Soviet Union in the
Sovereignty Declaration regarding the German Democratic Republic. 40
On February 10, 1990 General Secretary Gorbachev confirmed the
German right to self-determination and reunification pursuant to their
freely expressed will.
41
This statement was a reaction to continuing flow of East German
citizens leaving their homes to build a new life in the West. The East
German provisional government's attempts to stem the flood had been
without effect on the mass exodus of the country's most precious
resource: young and qualified workers. Reforms had come too late and
had not managed to restore the peoples' faith in their government and the
future of their country. The danger of economic and administrative
breakdown grew and the loss of its citizens threatened to anihilate the
German Democratic Republic.
III. Toward the Reunification of Germany
:1. Options under The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany
The pace of these developments took all sides by surprise. Only in
November 1989 the Federal Republic's "three-stage-plan", which
sketched the gradual reunification of Germany via a confederation, had
seemed premature and daring.42 A few months later it was evident that
a'much quicker solution was necessary to avert the looming collapse of
the German Democratic Republic. It was more and more clear that there
was no time for the elaboration of a new constitution, but a desperate
need to end the legal limbo paralyzing all levels of life in the German
Democratic Republic. Hesitation within the German Democratic
Republic itself had given way to a broad consensus in favour of fast
38. E. Klein, "An der Schwelle zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands" (1990), 43 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1065 at 1067 [At the Threshold to the Reunification of Germany]
[hereinafter: Threshold].
39. Starck, supra, note 34 at 350.
40. Supra, note 20; and see: K. Hailbronner, "Volker-und Europarechtliche Fragen der
deutschen Wiedervereinigung" (1990), 45 Juristenzeitung 449 at 450 [Questions of
International and European Law regarding the Reunification of Germany].
41. Starck,supra, note 34 at 351.
42. See Haberle, supra, note 2 at 358.
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reunification. 4a Not only had thousands of East Germans "voted with
their feet" (a phrase coined to describe their exodus), a vast majority also
supported the pro-reunification parties in the elections of March
1990."4
The Germans in the German Democratic Republic had freely
expressed their will to be reunified with the Germans in the Federal
Republic. The central requirement for action under the Basic Law's
Preamble had been met and cleared the way to achieving reunification
according to its rules. The Basic Law provides two avenues for
reunification and there was some discussion as to the proper procedure.
The first provision relevant in this context is Article 23,2 of the Basic
Law which states: "For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the
territory of the Linder (.. .). In other parts of Germany it shall be put into
force on their accession"45
The second provision to be considered in the debate on reunification
is Article 146 of the Basic Law: "This Basic Law shall cease to be in force
on, the day on which a constitution adopted by a free decision of the
German people comes into force."
Before discussing the considerations for and against these provisions in
more detail, it should be stated that the constitution of the German
Democratic Republic offers no alternative to the options for reunification
provided by the Basic Law. The German Democratic Republic's
constitution cannot be the foundation for a democratic state. It also
contains no reference whatsoever to the possibility of reuinification and,
therefore, does not even provide a mechanism for it to be achieved. The
constitution's silence, however, does not preclude reunification as such.
This is due to the fact, as is rightfully pointed out be one scholar, that the
East German constitution was rendered obsolete by the revolutionary
events of the recent past.46
.The two options provided by the Basic Law have been characterized
as the "small" (Article 23) and the "big" (Article 146) solutions. 47 While
this terminology may describe the extent of "activity" required, one
should be careful not to attach to Article 23,2 the stigma of a minimalist
approach. This would not do justice to the fact that both provisions are
equally valid legislative options.
43. W. Binne, "Forum: Verfassungsrechtliche Uberlegungen zu einem Beitritt der DDR nach
Artikel 23 GG" (1990), Juristische Schulung 446 at 447 [Constitutional Considerations
Regarding an Accession of the GDR under Article 23 of the Basic Law].
44. Klein, supra, note 38 at 1066.
45. Emphasis added.
46. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1068.
47. Haberle, supra note 2 at 358.
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Article 23,2 - this is why it was labelled "small solution" - does not
require the creation of a new all-German constitution. Instead the
German Democratic Republic would come under the umbrella of the
existing Basic Law which would then be applicable to Germany as a
whole.
Given the wording of Article 23,2, which does not refer to a 'request
for accession' but simply speaks of 'accession', the initiative rests solely
with the German Democratic Republic.48 Once it freely expresses its will
to accede to the Federal Republic, the process is set in motion without the
need for the Federal Republic to "accept". 49 In, fact, the Federal
Republic cannot decline the accession, but only negotiate the details of its
bringing about.50 That process will necessarily require a certain
transitional period which can be accomodated under Article 23. 51
Technically, all that is required on the Federal Republic's side is a federal
law making the Basic Law applicable to all acceded parts of Germany.5 2
Article 23 does not specify this aspect: the requirement of a federal law
can be taken from an analogy to Article 59 (2) of the Basic Law
regarding the ratification of international agreements. German
constitutional scholars widely agree that the accession route is open either
to the German Democratic Republic as a whole or to any of its Linder,
once they are reestablished. 53 The former Linder in the eastern part of
Germany will be reconstituted in elections scheduled for October 4,
1990.54
It is also generally accepted that the German Democratic Republic is
a "part of Germany" within the meaning of Article 23,2. There is a
precedent for the use of this provision, the 1956/57 accession of the
Saarland to the Federal Republic. 55 In a decision on the "Grundlagenver-
trag" (Basic Treaty) the German Federal Constitutional Court held that
the wording of Article 23,2 was to be widely construed and included the
German Democratic Republic. 56 Neither the accession of the Saarland
nor any political development had rendered the provision obsolete. In the
48. Generally held view: see Haberle, supra, note 2 at 358; Binne, supra, note 43 at 449.
49. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1070.
50. Haberle, supra, note 2 at 359; Starck, supra, note 34 at 353.
51. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1070.
52. Starck, supra, note 34 at 353; Haberle, supra, note 2 at 359; Binne, supra, note 43 at 450.
53. Starck, supra, note 34 at 359; Haberle, supra, note 38 at 358; Binne, supra, note 43 at 450;
more hesitant: Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1070.
54. TL. Friedman, "Two Germanys Vow to Accept Border with the Poles", New York Times,
July 18, 1990 Al, A6.
55. Starck, supra, note 34 at 352.
56. BVerfG supra, note 30, at 28 et.seq..
German Reunification
contrary, the Federal Republic was under its Basic Law not allowed to
endanger the goal of reunification.
57
Article 146 appears to more match the classical concept of constitution
making. The constituent power, that is the German People as a whole, is
called upon to terminate the transitional order established under the Basic
Law by giving itself a new all-German constitution. The provision
requires the free decision of the German people, either directly or via its
democratically legitimized representatives.
58
Some also argue both processes should be combined to have the
swiftness of one and the thoroughness of the other. It is suggested that the
German Democratic Republic should accede to the Federal Republic,
but reserve the right to participate in a joint constitution eventually to be
created. 59
The Basic Law itself is silent regarding priority or even the
appropriateness of one of these approaches. Only a few voices in the
older literature argue that Article 146 takes precedence over Article 23.60
Yet the history of the Basic Law and Article 23 in particular does not
confirm this view. Rather, the drafters of the constitution wanted to
provide a quick way to restate national unity. Article 146 is to be
understood as evidence of the intention to install the Basic Law only as
a transitional order.61
The Basic Law, however, has in the meantime grown into a full
constitution.62 Also, when contemplated more closely, Article 23 cannot
be said to entail any deficit in legitimacy. The provision does, in fact, lead
to a perfect legitimization of the Basic Law as the constitution of a unified
Germany. While the current Basic Law does not claim to apply to all
Germans (Preamble, Article 146), it also explicitely recognizes the fact
that a part of the German people was denied the opportunity to
participate in the creation of the Basic Law.63 Article 23,2 offers them the
opportunity to now legitimize the Basic Law as their constitution by
accession.64
Large parts of the Federal Government, the East German "Alliance for
Germany", and the vast majority of German constitutional law teachers
57. Ibid at 29.
58. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1069.
59. Haberle, supra, note 2 at 359, 360; K.-H. Seifert et.al., eds., Grundgesetz fur die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1988), Artikel 146, No. 1,2 [Basic Law for the Federal Republic
of Germany].
60. See Binne, supra, note at 447 for references.
61. Ibid., at 448.
62. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1069.
63. See Preamble, supra, p. 1.
64. Klein, Threshol4 supra, note 38 at 1069.
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favoured the Article 23 solution.65 It is currently to be expected that the
German reunification will be brought about under this provision and
before the end of the year.66 The practical reasons for this preference lie
in the need to quickly provide the constitutional basis for a unified
Germany. Not only do economic and social conditions call for immediate
action. One also needs to keep in mind the need for stability in a period
of transition. The Basic Law has proven to be a solid order, a coherent
system offering the continuity needed in the nearer future.
67
In what way can the Four Powers influence the reunification process?
While their rights continue to exist until a formal peace treaty with
Germany is signed, they are legally speaking not in a position to oppose
the reunification of Germany. They clearly have a say as to the
international dimension of the reunification process, but cannot influence
how it will be brought about internally.68 The reason for this is rooted in
the special character of the Four Power rights which are intimately linked
to the responsibility to support the reunification. It was pointed out
earlier that all of the former Occupying Powers have recognized the goal
of reunification. 69
2. Legal Questions Arising
The technical side of the reunification as such does not cause
insurmountable problems. The multitude of legal issues it entails,
however, will be far more difficult to address. As is typical of the German
question, these problems arise both at the internal and the international
levels. At least the reunification of Germany will eliminate the
international component, from the current mixture of administrative law,
constitutional law and international law.
On the internal level a unified Germany will have to address the issue
of how to divide/organize the enlarged federation. The five Linder
which once made up the German Democratic Republic could be re-
established and Berlin - because of its size - could be accorded the
status of a 16th Land. 70 The only constraints on the recreating
constitutions and structures of these Linder are set by Article 28 of the
65. Binne, supra, note 43 at 447 with further references; Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at
1069,1070; Starck, supra, note 34 at 352-355.
66. Friedman, supra, note 54 at A6.
67. Starck, supra, note 34 at 354.
68. Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 450; Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1067, 1068.
69. Supra, pp. 10, 11; see also Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 450.
70. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1071; Starck, supra, note 34 at 357; see infra p.21
regarding the status of Berlin.
German Reunification
Basic Law according to which the Linder have to mirror certain basic
values of the constitution:
The constitutional order in the Liinder must conform to the principles of
republican, democratic and social government based on the rule of law,
within the meaning of the Basic Law.71
A more time-consuming and complicated task will be the harmonization
of the German legal systems which, over the last forty years, have evolved
into very different directions. Federal laws will have to be uniform and
generally applicable. However, certain "grace periods" will be necessary
in order to allow for a smooth change-over. 72 That is also true for the
Civil Code73 and related laws, particularly in the commercial area.
Property issues and the like will have to be settled as quickly as possible
since an uncertain legal situation will deter the desparately needed
investment and economic activity in the German Democratic Republic. 74
Another urgent matter is the reform of the administrative and judicial
system in the GDR, which currenlty does not conform to western
democratic standards.75
A first step to addressing the briefly sketched issues was taken on July
1, 1990 when the German Democratic Republic and the Federal
Republic of Germany signed an agreement bringing about the economic
and currency union of the two states.76 On that day the Deutsche Mark
was made the official currency in both parts of Germany, the Federal
Republic's social system was extended to the German Democratic
Republic and most border controls were eliminated. In its Chapter I the
agreement sets out its foundations: the recognition of a free, democratic,
federal and social order based on the rule of law (Article 2), the first steps
taken toward the harmonization of law (Article 4) and guaranteed access
to justice (Article 6). Chapters II, III, and IV deal with the currency,
71. The basic principles referred to in Article 28 are set out in Article 20 of the Basic Law
which reads:
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.
(2) All state authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised by the people by
means of elections and voting and by specific legislative, executive, and judicial organs.
(3) Legislation shall be subject to the constitutional order; the executive and judiciary
shall be bound by law and justice.
(4) ...
72. Starck, supra, note 34 at 355.
73. The German Civil Code which dates back to 1900 had originally been applicable to all
of Germany. However, the judiciary, the demands of modem society, and EEC regulations
have since substantially developed civil law in the Federal Republic of Germany.
74. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1071.
75. See Starck, supra, note 34 at 356.
76. German text published in DIE WELT- Nr. 113 - May 16,1990, pp. 10, 11.
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economic and social unions respectively, and Chapter V covers
budgetary issues. A second treaty on "legal, practical and logistical
technicalities, and an election law" are scheduled to be negotiated by
December 2, 1990.7
7
Beyond the national scope the unifying/unified Germany is faced with
a host of international legal questions.
It was clear that it would have to settle the sensitive issue of its eastern
borders as soon as it is reunified. Because of the legal situation outlined
earlier,78 the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic
could not - be it individually or jointly - change the border.79 Only a
reunified Germany has the power to conclude a treaty with Poland. Once
this is accomplished, all references to reunification should be removed
from the Basic Law. The respective passages in the Preamble, Article
23,2 and Article 146 will have lost their relevance. Their removal will
also be a further step toward giving the Basic Law a permanent character.
These aspects have now been addressed between the two Germanys and
Poland. In a historical agreement both German states now assured
Poland that a border treaty will be concluded as quickly as possible after
unification. The Polish government expressed its satisfaction with the
proposal consisting of the following five principles: (1) after the signing
of a final settlement the united Germany will delete any legal language
suggesting the provisional character of its border with Poland; (2) a
united Germany will only comprise the territory of the present two
German states and Berlin; (3) the Parliament of a united Germany will
confirm the Oder-Neisse-Line in a treaty with Poland "in the shortest
time possible"; (4) a united Germany will give up any territorial claims,
and (5) the Four Allies agree to observe the fulfilment of these
commitments. 80
Germany and the Four Powers will have to sign a peace treaty which
will also have to terminate their powers and privileges in Germany.81
Among other things this will have effect on the basis upon which foreign
troops are stationed in Germany. 82 According to the political agenda at
the time of writing, a meeting in Moscow is scheduled for September 12,
1990. The plan is to draft an agreement that will indeed terminate all
77. Friedman, supra, note 54 at A6.
78. See supra, p....
79. On June 21, 1990 their Parliaments had adopted corresponding resolutions guaranteeing
that the Oder-Neisse-Line would remain the border; see Friedman, supra, note 54 at A6.
80. Friedman, supra, note 54 at A6.
81. Regarding the general agreement as to the necessity of a peace treaty see supra p. 10; and
Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 451.
82. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1073.
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Four Power rights and responsibilities over Germany. This draft is to be
submitted to a summit meeting of the Conference on security and
Cooperation in Europe scheduled for Paris on November 19, 1990.83 A
peace treaty must further bring about the end of Berlin's special status.
Currently it does not - inspite of the wording of Article 23,1 of the Basic
Law - have the status of a Land of the Federal Republic of Germany.84
The three western Powers, in their recognition of the Berlin constitution
of 1950, made it clear that federal laws can only be applied in Berlin
when they are enacted in the shape of a Berlin law.85
Another very complex area will be the treaty relations in which both
German states are entangled. The reunification of Germany will be a test
case for the controversial law of state succession. The 1978 Vienna
Convention on the Law of State Succession has not entered into force.86
It is a matter of controversy whether any of its provisions may be said to
have attained the status of customary international law.87
There is a dispute as to whether the reunification of Germany would
be a case of two states merging into one. 88 In this case the continuity
principle (Article 31 Vienna Convention) would apply and, in principle,
both sides' treaty relations would remain intact.89 In the case of
incompatible obligations an argument could be made in favour of the
termination of treaties (Article 311 b Vienna Convention).
The majority of writers contend that the reunification of Germany is a
case of one state incorporating another. 90 As a result of this view the
concept of "moving treaty frontiers" will be relevant (Article 15 Vienna
Convention). The German Democratic Republic would no longer exist
as a subject of international law. Therefore its treaty relations would be
anihilated. The treaty relations of the Federal Republic would extend to
encompass the former German Democratic Republic.91
83. Friedman, supra, note 54 at A 1.
84. Klein, in:t Starck, supra, note 35 at 25, points out that the Treaty on the Presence of
Foreign Troups in the Federal Republic of Germany of October 23, 1954 ceases to be in fcrce
once a peace treaty enters into force.
85. von Mangoldt, supra, note 27 at 6.
86. UN DOC. A/CONE 80/31; reprinted in: (1978), 17 Int'L Legal Mat 1488.
87. See S.A. Williams and A. de Mestral, An Introduction to International Law, 2nd ed.
(1987) at 98.
88. Klein, Threshold, supra, note 38 at 1072; for different types of cases in which state
succession may arise see: M.N. Shaw, International Law, 2nd ed. (1986) at 440.
89. Ibid.
90. E.Grabitz and A. von Bogdany, "Deutsche Einheit und Europaische Integration" (1990),
43 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1073 at 1076 [German Unity and European Integration];
Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 453.
91. The German Democratic Republic would, e.g., automatically cease to be a member of
COMECON or the United Nations; see Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 451.
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Of particular importance and interest, finally, is the question of the
German membership in the European Communities. While there is no
doubt that a membership is desired by both German states and the
Communities, its technical dimensions remain to be clarified.
Until the reunification of Germany is achieved the German
Democratic Republic can join the EEC according to Article 237 EEC
Treaty.92 The Democratic Republic's application for membership would
be considered in light of its ability to - after a transitional stage - grow
into the existing primary and secondary Community law. This includes
the body of law developed by the European Court of Justice and basic
principles such as democracy, guaranteed protection of human rights and,
the EEC's economic system.93 The latter aspect may well cause
considerable problems. The German Democratic Republic is currently in
no position to open itself to full competition. 94
The Federal Republic's membership in the European Communities
does not preclude it from seeking reunification. The Federal Republic has
consistently reserved this option for itself.95
Most writers consider a formal accession of the German Democratic
Republic (Article 237) or an adaptation of the EEC Treaty (Article 236)
unnecessary.96 Because of Article 227 of the EEC Treaty which confirms
the concept of moving treaty frontiers the EEC Treaty will automatically
extend its application to the German Democratic Republic. 97 It goes
without saying that it will be necessary to phase the German Democratic
Republic into its EEC obligations under this provision as well.98
IV. Conclusion
The preceding account could only highlight a selection of issues related
to the reunification of Germany. However, even this cursory account
provides an indication of how much is involved in the seemingly natural
process of reunifying a country.
The reunification of Germany is not only an extraordinary legal
phenomenon. It also is an event of historical importance in more than
92. Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 455.
93. Grabitz/von Bogdany, supra, note 90 at 1078.
94. Ibid, at1076; the authors provide the example of the application of the Community
environmental standards which would force most of the German Democratic Republic's
industries to close down.
95. Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 454.
96. Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 455; Starck, supra, note 34 at 356.
97. Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 456, points out that the EEC Treaty was extended via
Article 227 to St. Pierre et Miquelon.
98. Hailbronner, supra, note 40 at 456, 457.
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one sense. Not only will it conclude a chapter of post war history. It also
leads into a new era of redefined structures and power balances within an
increasingly integrated Europe. Currently, the first all-German elections
since the Second World War are scheduled for December 2, 1990.
Unification could then be achieved before the end of the year and an all-
German Parliament could be convened in January 1991. 99 Yet a great
deal of re-connecting and soul-searching will be necessary until the two
Germanies will truly be one again. This is important to keep in
perspective in the present rush to deal with the legal issues at hand.
99. Friedman, supra, note 54 at A6.
